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Abstract
The present work studies and analyzes general defaultable OTC contract in presence of a contin-
gent CSA, which is a theoretical counterparty risk mitigation mechanism of switching type that
allows the counterparty of a general OTC contract to switch from zero to full/perfect collate-
ralization and switch back whenever she wants until contract maturity paying some switching
costs and taking into account the running costs that emerge over time. The motivation and the
underlying economic idea is to show that the current full/partial collateralization mechanisms
defined within contracts’ CSA - and now imposed by the banking supervision authorities - are
”suboptimal” and less economic than the contingent one that allows to optimally take in account
all the relevant driver namely the expected costs of counterparty default losses - represented by
the (bilateral) CVA - and the expected collateral and funding costs. In this perspective, we
tackle the problem from the risk management and optimal design point of view solving - under
some working assumptions - the derived stochastic switching control model via Snell envelope
technique and important results of the theory of the backward stochastic differential equations
with reflection (RBSDE). We have also studied the numerical solution providing an algorithm
procedure for the value function computation based on an iterative optimal stopping approach.
1 Introduction.
1.1 Literature review.
The present research work explores and develops some issues related to the valuation and risk
management of general OTC contracts in presence of counterparty risk, namely credit value
adjustment (CVA), collateralization and funding.
The counterparty risk valuation and impact in pricing and risk management has gained great
importance and relevance in everyday financial markets. Particularly, in the aftermath of the
last crisis and Lehman Brothers default, this risk has been regularly traded by the financial
institutions on their over the counter positions via the charge of the well-known ”Credit Value
Adjustment” (CVA, we refer to section two for its formal definition), which was one of the major
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causes of the relevant losses suffered during the crisis due to deterioration of the counterparty
credit/rating conditions. Almost at the same time, OTC deals, especially credit derivatives and
interest rate swaps, have seen a large increment of the collateral provision and collateralization
mechanisms defined within the contract. These are typically defined in a specific annex known as
”credit support annex” (CSA). The reason for this is that setting a collateralization mechanism
allows the counterparties to reduce or even null the CVA (this depends on the type of collaterali-
zation, full or partial and on margining), that is the integral of the expected weighted exposures
on counterparty default risk taken over the life of the underlying contract or equivalently the
cost for the setting of a dynamic hedging strategy to minimize this risk.
To remark the relevance of this issue, also the Basel Committee has intervened on counterparty
risk defining new provisions and rules (in Basel three) in order to assess and control the counter-
party risk. In particular, capital charges have been introduced to take in account for the volatility
of the CVA in addition to a central counterparty clearing house that operates as ”guarantor”
of all the market transactions with the obligation to set only full collateralysed procedure with
the counterparties that transfer to it their credit/default risk. So counterparty risk represents a
crucial element to assess and analyze.
As regards the literature, main recent works have dealt with the modeling of CVA dynamics
and collateral mechanisms within specific derivatives products and at portfolio level. As regards
this point, are worth of mention the monographic works of Gregory (2010) and Cesari (2009)
which provide a detailed analysis of the problem involved both from the pricing/hedging and
risk management point of view. In particular, they tackle the problem related to CVA modeling
and hedging highlighting the possible approaches based on dynamic and static hedging strategies
in presence of collateral mechanisms too, focussing especially on operational and computational
aspects (at portfolio level in particular) and showing examples and applications to different type
of derivative products. Also Bielecki et al. (2011) have faced the CVA hedging issue in a Markov
copula framework proposing a dynamic hedging strategy based on an abstract contract, called
”rolling CDS”, written on the default event of the counterparty derived via the mean-variance
hedging approach - given the market incompleteness and the impossibility to replicate the CVA.
For what concerns the importance and the role of collateral in credit risk mitigation and CVA
reduction, other than the already mentioned works of Cesari (2010), Gregory (2009), are wor-
th of mention the works of Brigo, Capponi et al. (2011) that model and analyze the impact
of collateralization (including rehypotecation and netting) on CVA and on defaultable claims
arbitrage-free pricing; Cossin & Aparicio (2001), working under a structural framework, for first
propose to use the collateral as a suitable control instrument of the counterparty risk and using
it to set a stochastic impulse control problem (with controlled diffusion dynamic) solved via
variational inequalities numerical methods.
Johannes & Sundaresan (2003) instead, analyze the role of collateral in the determination of the
market swap rates, highlighting its relevance and impact. Their observations are extended by
Fujii & Takahashi (2010, 2011) considering the collateral role in term structure modeling and -
adopting a Duffie & Huang framework and using the Gauteaux functional derivative - they are
able to show the relevant impact that collateral mechanism defined in both unilateral and bila-
teral CSA can have on CVA (underlining the relative issues of the cost of funding, the collateral
currency choice problem and the model risk especially in presence of exotic products).
Other works worth of mention on collateral issue are those of Pieterbarg (2010) who introdu-
ces it in the classic Black and Scholes framework and Bielecki, Cialenko & Iyigunler (2011)
which derive - in a Markov copula framework - collateralized CVA dynamic and its impact on
arbitrage-free pricing calculating the spread value adjustment in the case of CDS products (with
all the counterparties involved defaultable). In relation to funding imprtant references are those
of Brigo et al. (2011) that generalizes the CVA valuation in presence of CSA including funding
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(defining the so called FVA) Crepey (2011) that for first rigourously tackles - using the theory
of backward SDE - the price-hedge problem for a general contract in presence of CSA and funding.
1.2 Objective and main contributions.
In the present work we analyze a theoretically new scheme in which two defaultable counterpar-
ties want to define a CSA characterized by the flexibility and the possibility for both of them
to call/put the collateralization during the life of the underlying claim/contract. We refer spe-
cifically to a contingent risk mitigation mechanism that allows the counterparty to switch from
zero to full/perfect collateralization (or even partial) and switch back whenever she wants until
maturity T paying some switching costs and taking into account the running costs that emerge
over time.
The running costs that we model and consider in the analysis of this problem are - by one side
- those related to CVA namely counterparty risk hedging costs and - by the other side - the
collateral and funding/liquidity costs that emerge when collateralization is active.
We can summarize the characteristics and the basic idea underlying the problem (that we show
to admit a natural formulation as a stochastic (multiple) impulse/switching control problem) th-
rough the so defined contingent CSA scheme shown below (Fig. 1.1), in which - by considering
also the funding issue in the picture - is present a third party, an external funder assumed for
convenience default free (λ = 0).
Figura 1: The basic underlying idea.
Our main contributions are a fairly general formulation (not as general as possible) of the
problem under analysis as a stochastic switching control one (set in section two an three) , its
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solution existence and uniquenessshowed through suitable stochastic methods - mainly the Snell
envelope and the reflected backward SDE representation - (section four)and the definition of the
algorithm for the numerical solution based on an iterative optimal stopping procedure combined
with the Longstaff-Schwartz method which we implement in the case of a defaultable interest
rate swap (with the contingent CSA that we define) (in section five).
2 Model framework, Definitions and working Assumptions.
2.1 Model framework.
To begin is convenient to describe the framework in which we work and to give some useful
definitions of the processes and variables involved. The framework is the typical one of the
reduced-form models literature: we are in continuous time and we have a probability space
described by the triple (Ω,Gt,Q) in which lie two strictly positive random time τi for i ∈ {A,B},
which represent the default times of the counterparties considered in our model. In addition, we
define the default process Hit = 1{τi≤t} and the relative filtration Hi generated by Hit for any
t ∈ R+. This implies that the full filtration of the model is given by G = F ∨HA ∨HB where F
is the (risk-free) market filtration usually generated by a Brownian motion W (or a vector Wˆ )
adapted to it, under the real measure Q. In the rest of the work we are used to denote with
Gt = σ(Ft∨HA∨HB)t≥0 that is the sigma algebra of the enlarged market filtration. In addition,
we remember that all the processes we consider, in particular Hi, are ca´dla´g semimartingales G
adapted and τ i are G stopping times (which means to be in a Skorohod topology).
For convenience, let us define the first default time of the counterparties as τ = τA ∧ τB which
also represent the ending/exstinction time of the underlying contract, with the corresponding
indicator process Ht = 1{τ≤t}.For what concerns the underlying market model it is assumed
arbitrage-free, meaning that it admits a spot martingale measure Q∗ (not necessarily unique)
equivalent to Q. A spot martingale measure is associated with the choice of the savings account
Bt (so that B
−1 as discount factor) as a numeraire that, as usual, is given by Ft-predictable
process
Bt = exp
∫ t
0
rsds, ∀ t ∈ R+ (1)
For convenience, we assume that the immersion property holds in our framework, so that eve-
ry ca´dla´g G-adapted (square-integrable) process is also F-adapted. In particular, the processes
and random variable that we encounter in the following sections will be in general G-adapted
or predictable and often Gτ -measurable, but because the default time τ is inaccessible in the
reduced framework, one needs to work with F-adapted or predictable process called pre-default
value processes, denoted with X− that is the left limiting process of X. The following lemma
is a classic results2 that allows this change of filtration.
Lemma 2.1.1. Set J := 1 −H = 1{t≤τ}.For any G-adapted, respectively G-predictable pro-
cess X over [0, T ], there exists a unique F-adapted, respectively F-predictable, process X˜ over
[0, T ], called the pre-default value process of X, such that JX = JX˜, respectively J−X = J−X˜.
Remarks 2.1.1. 1) In particular, in our framework we assume also true that, F-local mar-
tingales stopped at τ are also G-local martingale, which is a just a modification of the immersion
hypothesis.
2See Jeanblanc & Le cam (2008) for details.
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2) Therefore is worth to remind that F-adapted ca´dla´g process cannot jump at τ so one has that
∆X = 0 almost surely, for every F-adapted ca´dla´g process X.
These are technical conditions necessary to make more workable the framework and the model
that being characterized by defaultable processes, whose value at default is inaccessible, allow
to set off jump behavior and all the problems related to consider in the model also close out
clause and the contract replacement costs (for which we refer for example to Brigo, Capponi et
al (2011)). Anyway, this will be clear in the next section.
2.2 Main definitions.
Let us firstly recall the main definitions that we need for our model about bilateral CVA, CSA
with perfect/full collateralisation and our theoretical contingent CSA scheme. Further details
can be found in (reference).
We start giving some general definitions of the price process (or NPV) and CVA for a defaultable
claim for which no CSA that is no collateralization and other mitigation mechanism has been
defined by the parties within the relative contract.
First of all, by a defaultable claim signed between two risky counterparty maturing at time T we
mean the quadruple (X; A;Z; τ), where X is an FT -measurable random variable, A = (At)t∈[0,T ]
is an F-adapted, continuous process of finite variation with A0 = 0, Z = (Zt)t∈[0,T ] is an
F-predictable process, and τ = τA ∧ τB is the first default time of one of the counterparties
(assumed completely inaccessible in the reduced form framework).
Definition 2.2.1 (Clean dividend and price process). The clean dividend process Drft
of a counterparty default free (exchange traded) contract is the F-adapted process described by
the final payoff X, the cashflows A and τ = τ i =∞ as follows
Drft = X1[T,∞](t) +
∑
i∈{A,B}
(∫
]t,T ]
dAiu
)
t ∈ [0, T ]. (2)
The clean price process Srf would be simply represented by the integral over time of the dividend
process under the relative pricing measure, that is
Srft = BtEQ∗
(∫
]t,T ]
B−1u dD
rf
u
∣∣Ft) t ∈ [0, T ]. (3)
Definition 2.2.2 (Bilateral risky dividend and price process). The dividend process
Dt of a defaultable claim with bilateral counterparty risk (X; A;Z; τ), is defined as the total cash
flows of the claim until maturity T that is formally
Dt = X1{T<τ}1[T,∞](t) +
∑
i∈{A,B}
(∫
]t,T ]
(1−Hiu)dAiu +
∫
]t,T ]
ZudH
i
u
)
t ∈ [0, T ] (4)
for i ∈ {A,B}.
Similarly, the (ex-dividend) price process St of a defaultable claim with bilateral counterparty risk
maturing in T is defined as the integral of the discounted dividend flow under the risk neutral
measure Q∗, namely the NPVt of the claim, that is formally
NPVt = St = BtEQ∗
(∫
]t,T ]
B−1u dDu
∣∣Gt) t ∈ [0, T ]. (5)
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Given these definitions for the price and dividend process, we are able to state the following
general definition for the bilateral CVA (at a given time t)
BCV At = S
rf
t − St ∀ t ∈ [0, T ].
as the difference between the counterparty risk free and risky price process/NPV of the contract.
Let us state the following proposition on bilteral CVA.
Proposition 2.2.3 (Bilateral CVA). The bilateral CVA process of a defaultable claim with
bilateral counterparty risk (X; A;Z; τ) maturing in T satisfies the following relation3
BCV At = CV At −DV At
= BtEQ∗
[
1{t<τ=τB≤T}B
−1
τ (1−RBc )(Srfτ )−
∣∣∣∣Gt]+
− BtEQ∗
[
1{t<τ=τA≤T}B
−1
τ (1−RAc )(Srfτ )+
∣∣∣∣Gt] (6)
for every t ∈ [0, T ], where Ric for i ∈ {A,B} is the counterparty recovery rate (process).
Proof. The proposition proof follows the same simplified lines of the proposition 2.9 of Bie-
lecki, Cialenko & Iyigunler (2011).
Let us remark (see for example Brigo et al. (2010)) that in case of independence between
discount factor and default intensities4 the CVA process can be represented in terms of EPE and
ENE as follows
BCV At = BtEQ∗
(
1{t<τ=τA≤T}B
−1
τ (1−RAc )(Srfτ )+
)−BtEQ∗(1{t<τ=τB≤T}B−1τ (1−RBc )(Srfτ )−)
= Bt
∫
]t,T ]
B−1s EPEsQ∗(τA ∈ ds, s ≤ τB)−Bt
∫
]t,T ]
B−1s ENEsQ∗(τB ∈ ds, s ≤ τA) (7)
for t ∈ [0, T ] where from the framework section we know that Q∗(τi ∈ ds, s ≤ τi) = λit :=
G−1(t)Q∗(t = τi ∈ dt), namely the counterparty default intensities.
As regards the CSA, it can be described, in general terms, as an articulated part of the
OTC contracts devoted to mitigate the counterparty risk through the definition of a collateral
agreement between the parties over the life of the underlying claim5. It has been largely used
also to reduce the capital requirements imposed by the Basel committee on portfolio exposures
and to give a more competitive price to the CVA charges.
As already mentioned, this type of agreement usually contains a lot of factors, clauses and events
that are complex to model (see Gregory (2011) for details). Let us now generalize the definition
of CVA in presence of the CSA.
Definition 2.2.4 (Collateral account/process). Let us define for the bilateral CSA of a
contract the positive/negative threshold with Γi for i = {A,B} and the positive minimum transfer
3The formulation is seen from the point of view of B. Being symmetrical between the party, just the signs
change.
4This orthogonality hypothesis will be useful in the implementation and numerical part.
5Now, thanks to diffusion of central clearings to mitigate the counterparty risk, this agreement has been
considering, as a third party involved, the central clearing as a guarantee of the transaction.
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amount with MTA. The collateral process Collt : [0, T ]→ R is a stochastic Ft-adapted process6
defined as follows
Collt = 1{Srft >ΓB+MTA}(S
rf
t − ΓB) + 1{Srft <ΓA−MTA}(S
rf
t − ΓA), (8)
on the time set {t < τ}, and
Collt = 1{Srf
τ−>ΓB+MTA}
(Srfτ− − ΓB) + 1{Srf
τ−<ΓA−MTA}
(Srfτ− − ΓA), (9)
on the set {τ ≤ t < τ + ∆t}.
Definition 2.2.5 (CSA close-out cashflows). Let us define the recovery rate Ric for
i ∈ {A,B} a G-predictable process set as a positive constant and the uncollateralized mark to
market as θt = S
rf
t − Collt (for t = τ). The CSA close-out cashflows is the real valued left
limited Gτ−-measurable process defined as follows
CfCSAt = Collt + 1{t=τB}(R
B
c θ
+
t − θ−t )− 1{t=τA}(RAc θ−t − θ+t )− 1{t=τA=τB}θt).
By using these definitions and following the same line of proof the proposition 2.2.3. this
proposition states.
Proposition 2.2.6 (CVA (bilateral) with CSA). The bilateral CVA for a defaultable
claim maturing in T and mitigated by a partial collateralization satisfies the following relation
BCV ACSAt = BtEQ
∗
[
1{t<τ=τB≤T}B
−1
τ (1−RBc )(Srfτ − Collτ )−
∣∣Gt]
− BtEQ∗
[
1{t<τ=τA≤T}B
−1
τ (1−RAc )(Srfτ − Collτ )+
∣∣Gt] (10)
∀t ∈ [0, T ], where the first term is the (unilateral) CVA and the second the DVA (collateralised).
In the case of CSA with perfect/full collateralization , say CollPerft , collateralization
can be easily understood as the limit case of the partial collateralization when the delta between
the margin dates, say ∆tm = tm − tm−1, tends to zero and no thresholds and minimum transfer
amount are defined in the related CSA. This means that CollPerft is always equal to the mark to
market, namely to the (default free) price process Srft of the underlying claim, that is formally
(by taking the definition 2.2.4)
CollPerft = 1{Srft >0}(S
rf
t − 0) + 1{Srft <0}(S
rf
t − 0) = Srft ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], on {t < τ}. (11)
and
CollPerft = S
rf
τ− ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], on {τ ≤ t < τ + δt} (12)
Then, by plugging the last relation in the definition 2.2.5 of CSA cashflows, one easily gets
CfCSAt = Coll
Perf
t ∀ t = τ ∈ [0, T ]. (13)
6In the literature, depending on the CSA provisions and modeling choice, the process is also considered
Ft-predictable or in general adapted to Gt.
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Actually, the CSA close out cashflows won’t get sense anymore because the counterparty risk
is zeroed with perfect collateral and, in fact, the CVA defined in 2.2.3 become
BCV AColl
Perf
t = BtEQ∗
[
1{t<τB≤T}(0)|Gt
]
−BtEQ∗
[
1{t<τA≤T}(0)|Gt
]
= 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ] (14)
that implies
BCV AColl
Perf
t = S
rf
t − St = 0 =⇒
St = S
rf
t ∀t ∈ [0, T ] (15)
namely the equality between the defaultable price and risk free price of the claim.
Now we are ready to define the contingent mechanism of switching type that we assume to be
set between the parties in our model. It can be seen as a mix of zero and perfect collateralization
and it is natural to model it (as will be clearer from the next section) introducing the switching
indicators zj and times τj for j = 1, . . . ,M , that affects - being the agent controls - the system
dynamic and consequently the processes involved, in particular the collateral process. Let us
consider just two possible switching regimes (but it can be easily generalized also to the case of
partial collateralization) so that the indicator will take only two values, say zj = {0, 1}:
• when zj = 1 the collateral is null, no collateralization is active, that implies a full BCVA
(with no CSA);
• while for zj = 0 we have a CSA with perfect/full collateralization (which zeroes the BCVA).
So, as done before we give the main definitions for collateral and CVA process which now depend
also on these switching control {τj , zj}mj=1 variables that needs to be determined optimally. How,
it will be the object of the following section.
Definition 2.2.7 (Contingent Collateral process).The contingent collateral CollCt is the
Ft-adapted process defined for any time t ∈ [0, T ] and for every switching time τj ∈ [0, T ] and
j = 1, . . . ,M , switching indicator zj and default time τ (defined above as min{τA, τB} ), as
follows
CollCt = S
rf
t 1{zj=0}1{τj≤t<τj+1} + 01{zj=1}1{τj≤t<τj+1} on {t < τ} (16)
on the set {t < τ}, and
CollCt = S
rf
τ−1{zj=0}1{τj≤t<τj+1} + 01{zj=1}1{τj≤t<τj+1} (17)
on the set {τ ≤ t < τ + ∆t} where we recall that St = CollPerft from point b) results.
Using Definition 2.2.7 and the results stated for close out amounts and bilateral CVA, we
get easily the following results. Firstly, setting DC and SC as the dividend and price process in
presence of the contingent CSA just defined, we can set
DCt = D
rf
t 1{zj=0}1{τj≤t<τj+1} +Dt1{zj=1}1{τj≤t<τj+1}
SCt = S
rf
t 1{zj=0}1{τj≤t<τj+1} + St1{zj=1}1{τj≤t<τj+1}
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for t ∈ [0, T ∧ τ ]. From these relations it is easy to recover the general formulation for the
bilateral CVA process in the contingent case as follows
BCV ACt = S
rf
t − SCt
= Srft − (Srft 1{zj=0}1{τj≤t<τj+1} + St1{zj=1}1{τj≤t<τj+1})
= 01{zj=0}1{τj≤t<τj+1} +BCV At1{zj=1}1{τj≤t<τj+1}
so that the following definition is well posed.
Definition 2.2.7 (BCVA with contingent CSA). The bilateral CVA of a contract with
contingent CSA of switching type, BCV ACt is the Gt-adapted process defined for any time t ∈
[0, T ], for every switching time τj ∈ [0, T ] and j = 1, . . . ,M , switching indicator zj and default
time τ (defined as above), as follows
BCV ACt = BCV At1{zj=1}1{τj≤t<τj+1} + 01{zj=0}1{τj≤t<τj+1}, for t ∈ [0, T ∧ τ ], (18)
where the expression for BCV A is known from Proposition 2.2.3.
We end by noting that the CSA closeout cashflows are different from zero only when collate-
ralization is active, that is
CfCSAt = Coll
C
τ ∀ t = τ ∈ [0, T ].
Remarks 2.2.8. We underline that all these processes are in general ca´dla´g semi-martingales
and is difficult to deal with their dynamics which are also recursive and non linear being affected
by agent switching controls. In the next section we will see from the set up of the stochastic
control the working assumptions needed to ease the problem analysis.
2.3 Funding with CVA and collateral.
The funding issue and how to model it in the whole issue of pricing and hedging of derivatives
and defaultable claims in particular, is one of the main topic in the literature (a clear analysis of
the issue can be found in Brigo et al. (2011)). As concerns our problem, we assume the existence
of a cash account hold by an external funder, say CFundt ≷ 0, that can be positive or negative
depending on the funding (> 0) or investing (< 0) strategy that counterparty uses in relation
to the price and hedge of the specific deal which is also collateralysed in our case. Including the
funding in the analysis, this has impact on:
• the cashflows related to the hedging portfolio/strategy of the specific deal, especially if the
hedge cannot be perfect as in the case of defaultable claims so that the trader needs to
fund or invest the cash surplus deriving from his hedging portfolio;
• the cashflows related to CVA hedging; this is usually included in the hedging portfolio of
the whole claim;
• the cashflows related to the collateral/CSA defined between the parties; for example, when
the exposure trespass a specified threshold and the counterparty has to post/receive the
collateral it incurs in funding/opportunity costs.
In order to reduce the problem of recursion in relation to CVA, we make the assumption that
the CVA value is charged to the counterparty but no hedging portfolio is set, so that the funding
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costs are null CFund = 0 (namely the funding account is not active)7.
As regards the funding issue in relation to the collateralization, under the assumptions of
segregation (no rehypo) and collateral made up by cash, we distinguish the following cases:
1) If the counterparty has to post collateral in the margin account, she sustains a funding cost,
applied by the external funder, represented by the borrowing rate rborrt = rt+st that is the
risk free rate plus a credit spread (s) (that is usually different from the other party) . By
the other side, the counterparty receives by the funder the remuneration on the collateral
post, that is usually defined in the CSA as a risk free rate plus some basis points, so that
we can approximate it at the risk free rate, that is rt + bpt ∼= rt.
Clearly, we remark that the existence of the above defined rate implies the existence of the
following funding assets
dBborrt = (rt + st)B
borr
t dt (19)
dBremt = (rt + bpt)B
rem
t dt (20)
2) Instead, let’s consider the counterparty that call the collateral: as above the collateral is
remunerated at the rate given (as the remuneration for the two parties can be different)
by B¯rem, but she cannot use or invest the collateral amount (that is segregated), so she
sustains an opportunity cost, that can be represented by the rate roppt = rt +pit, where pi is
a premium over the risk free rate.
Hence, we assume the existence of the following assets too
dBoppt = (rt + pit)B
opp
t dt (21)
dB¯remt = (rt + b¯pt)B¯
rem
t dt (22)
The objective of the last definitions will be clearer from the next subsection in which we pass
to define the counterparty objective and in the third section in which we formally define the
stochastic switching control problem that we want to tackle.
2.4 Counterparty objective and recap of the working assumptions.
Now we have in mind all the relevant elements and variables that the counterparty of a collate-
ralysed defaultable claim of contingent type has to take in consideration to define the optimality
criterion/objective. As already said, the counterparty is assumed to be counterparty risk aver-
se, she wants to minimize the negative impact of CVA, namely the costs of the default of the
other party, via the definition of a contingent collateral/CSA, but she wants to do it optimally
deciding the optimal times when to switch to a partial or full collateralization. Of course the
collateralization implies other running costs, like the funding ones. So, the objective will be to
determine over the set of controls represented by the switching time (and indicator) the optimal
switching strategy that minimizes over [0, T ] the overall running costs related to CVA, collateral
and funding and the instantaneous switching costs that we need to model. This kind of problem
is highly non linear and recursive, as already highlighted above, and because of in the partial
collateralization case the CVA process is complicated by the presence of the CSA close out cash-
flows that depends recursively on the controls (the switching times), this makes the analysis more
complex. So, for the next sections, we leave aside the partial collateralization and we analyze
the problem for the counterparty in the twofold decision case: ”switch from zero collateral (full
CVA) to full collateralization (zero CVA)” (and viceversa).
7An alternative simplifying assumption is that the CVA hedging is realized without resorting to funding.
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We recall here the main working assumption that we use in the analysis of the problem for the
following sections:
Hp 1) The analysis is done under the ”symmetry hypothesis”: the parties of the deal have
symmetric objectives and similar default intensities in order to reduce problem dimension
(this is a working assumption particularly useful in the numerical part).
Hp 2) Both the parties are counterparty risk averse but we assume no strategic interaction (issue
that will be object of an other work).
Hp 3) The analysis is focussed on the full/perfect collateralization case;
Hp 4) The CVA cost process is not funded, CFund = 0;
Hp 5) All the processes considered are intended to be pre-default value processes (as from lemma
2.1.1.)
3 Stochastic Switching Control Problem: Formulation and Solution
Existence.
3.1 Model dynamics and controls.
From the reasoning and definitions of the last section is quite clear what kind of stochastic
control problem we are facing: we are (conterparty A) in t = 0 and we want to determine the
optimal strategy that minimizes the expected costs deriving from switching the collateral from
zero to full and viceversa until the maturity of the underlying defaultable claim. It is natural to
formalize this problem as a multiple switching control problem with finite horizon (a particular
case of the more general class of impulse control models) whose main ingredients are:
1. the setting of the objective functional which is generally made up of an objective function,
a reward function and a switching/impulse cost function;
2. the setting of the stochastic dynamics that describe the state of the system considered;
3. the setting and modeling of the controls set in which search for the solution of the problem.
From the list set above, the last point is strictly related to the model for the ”system” dynamic,
which is more problematic given that the natural choice would be to consider the CVA dynamic
as it enters the objective functional of counterparty A (and symmetrically B as discussed above).
But it can be shown8 that CVA dynamic is quite complicate and is not an Ito diffusion, so we
need to use different solution methods (for general ca´dla´g processes) that we leave for further
research. Here, we we use - at cost of a minor generalization -
the bilateral CVA expression set in the latter section under the hypothesis of interest rate ortho-
gonal to τ , namely the default intensities of counterparty B. So in the following, for CVA/BCVA
we refer to the formula set in the equation 2.7, that we recall here as follows
BCV At = Bt
∫
]t,T ]
B−1s E
(
(1−RAc )(NPVτ )−|τA = s, τA ≤ τB
)
λAs ds
− Bt
∫
]t,T ]
B−1s E
(
(1−RBc )(NPVτ )+|τB = s, τB ≤ τA
)
λBs ds (23)
8See, for example, Bielecki, Cialenko & Iyigunler (2011).
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where we have used the default intensity definition for λit and we have made an abuse of notation
given the price process definition Srft := NPVt.
In order to model the system dynamic in our model, let us note that the BCVA, for a given
process realization (ω ∈ Ω) (and varying t ≤ T ), can be defined as a bounded and Ft-measurable
function f(.):
BCV A(t) =: f(t,NPV, λ,Bt, α) = f(t,X, λ, α)
of
- the price process (default free) or NPV, that can be expressed as a function h(t,X, k) (also
Ft-measurable ) of time, of some constants (k) and a stochastic factor X9, that is typically
the interest rate process, for example in an interest rate swap;
- of the default process τ which is determined through the intensity process, say λ that for
convenience (in order to reduce problem dimensionality) we have assumed similar for both
the counterparties λAt ≈ λBt ;
- discount factors that presume the existence in the model of a bank account defined by B−1t =
exp(− ∫ t
0
rsds);
- a vector of constant factors α = (k,Rc) defined in the contract, like the recovery rate Rc =
1− LGDc or the ”strike rate” that is included in k.
So, we are left to choose a model for (X,λ) namely the interest rates and the default intensities,
for which we assume the following general markovian diffusions
dXt = µ(t,Xt)X(t)dt+ σ(t,Xt)X(t)dW
x
t ; X(0) = x0 (24)
dλt = γ(t, λt)λ(t)dt+ ν(t, λt)λ(t)dW
λ
t ; λ(0) = λ0 (25)
d〈X,λ〉t = d〈W xt ,Wλt 〉t = ρX,λdt.
We keep this in mind and we remark that the dynamics of the system we are considering is
affected by the counterparty choice to switch from zero to full/partial collateral or viceversa, so
we need to define the control set for our problem.
In a multiple switching/impulse control type problem (with finite horizon) like this, in which
counterparty A can intervene or ”give impulse” to the system every times in [0, T ] through a
sequence of switching times, say τj ∈ T , with T ⊂ [0, T ], where we denote the switching set
T := {τ1, . . . , τM} = {τj}Mj=1
with the last switching {τM ≤ T} (M < ∞) and the τj are, by definition of stopping times,
Ft-measurable random variable. Therefore, at any of these switching times, we need to define
the related set of the switching/impulse indicator, which is quite trivial in our case with only
two possible switching regime:
Z := {z1, . . . , zM} = {zj}Mj=1
with the zj ’s that are Fτj -measurable switching indicators taking values zj = {0, 1} ∀j =
1, . . . ,M , so we have {
zj = 1⇒ ′′zerocollateral′′(fullCV A)
zj = 0⇒ ′′fullcollateral′′(nullCV A)
9This can be in general a stochastic vector.
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Here we are focussing on the simpler case of collateralization leaving the ”partial case” aside.
So we have that the control set for our problem is formed of all the sequences of indicators and
switching times C ∈ R+M , that is
C = {T ,Z} = {τj , zj}Mj=1
with the convention - and without losing generality - that in t = 0 the initial condition of the
indicator be z0 = 1 because usually contracts start with no collateralization at the inception
10.
Remarks 3.1.1. It is worth of mention that, as defined above, the set of switching con-
trols can be made up of maximum M switching times τj (and related indicators zj) being the
counterparty who decides optimally the number of switches that minimize her cost functional.
In general one could leave unbounded the number of switched allowed, namely M = ∞ leaving
its number determined endogenously by the solution of the stochastic optimization. An other
more restrictive possibility that is quite common in CSA contracts is to allow switching only at a
given set of dates τj ∈ [t1, . . . , tn] ⊂ [0, T ], typically the margin call dates or even at the coupon
exchange dates.
For a matter of notations, we define ζj = 1 − zj in order to better distinguish between the
two regimes, but the control set is intended to be the same.
At this point, we need to remark - from the definitions of contingent CSA and (bilateral) CVA
process, 2.2.6 e 2.2.7 - that the switching controls enter and affects the dynamic of this proces-
ses which are described by the system of stochastic differential equations assumed above. In
fact, as we know, switching to full collateralization implies CV A = 0 (and BCV A = 0), that is
St = S
rf
t = Coll
perf
t . This means no counterparty risk and so the default intensity dynamic dλt
won’t be relevant, just dX will be considered until z = 0, namely until the collateralization will
be kept active (ζ = 1). So, formally, we have:
if
{
zj = 1
}
and {τj ≤ t < τj+1} ⇒
DCt = Dt ⇒
SCt = St ⇒
BCV ACt = BCV At∀ t ∈ [0, T ∧ τ ]
so that the relevant dynamic to model the BCVA process in this regime is
dXt = µ(t,Xt)X(t)dt+ σ(t,Xt)X(t)dW
x
t ; X(0) = x0
dλt = γ(t, λt)λ(t)dt+ ν(t, λt)λ(t)dW
λ
t ; λ(0) = λ0
if
{
zj = 0
}
and {τj ≤ t < τj+1} ⇒
DCt = D
rf
t ⇒
SCt = S
rf
t = Coll
Perf
t ⇒
BCV ACt = 0∀ t ∈ [0, T ∧ τ ]
so that the relevant dynamic to model the process in this regime will be just
dXt = µ(t,Xt)X(t)dt+ σ(t,Xt)X(t)dW
x
t ; X(0) = x0
10In fact, we could have assumed a contract starting with full collateralization z0 = 0 at inception in t = 0, but
the analysis would have been the same.
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To ease the notation, we set our system dynamic in vectorial form defining
dY Cad(t) :=

dt
dXt
dλt
dZ
, Y Cad(0) =

t = 0
x0
λ0
Z0 = 1

where we are left to define the set of admissible switching control
{
Cad ⊆ C =
{T ,Z}}, admissi-
ble in the sense that our stochastic (controlled) system described by dY Cad has a unique solution.
3.2 Modeling the objective functional.
The last element left to model to complete the picture is the objective functional of the agent,
namely counteparty A. In general, the formulation of the objective functional for a switching
control minimization problem can be stated as follows:
J (T ,Z)(y) = inf
u∈{Cad}
Ey
[ ∫ T
t=0
(exp−r(T−s))FZ(Y u(s))ds+G(Y u(T ))1{T<∞}+
∑
τj<T
K
(
Y u(τj), zj
)∣∣∣∣Ft]
where for notational convenience has been set u =: {T ,Z}11 while the function F (.) represents
the agent objective that is in our case the running cost function, G(T ) is the so called ”reward
function” and K(.) the instantaneous switching costs of the problem.
As regards our problem, we have that:
a) For what concerns the running cost function F (.), we need to distinguish between the two
switching regimes.
So if {zj = 1} ,′′ zero collateral′′, we know from the latter section that the agent objective
is to minimize the BCVA costs, in particular we assume (mainly for technical reasons) that
counterparty A be interested in the minimization of the BCVA variance respect to a given
threshold δ. Formally we have:
Fz(Y
u(t)) = z[BCV A(t)− δ]2 ⇒ ′′min BCV A variance′′
where z is the control switching indicator that multiply the BCVA because it is set to z = 1
at inception and it can be zeroed when counterparty A decide ”optimally” to switch to
full collateral, setting z = 0. Here the threshold δ can be seen as an exogenous parameter,
for example it can be a given level of capital or liquidity allocated by the risk manage-
ment function or by the treasury as a target of the problem. An other possibility is to
set it, coherently with the definition of variance, as the expected BCVA value calculated
at inception in t = 0( alternatively one can also generalize the formulation by making the
threshold endogenous and setting it as a control of the problem possibly depending on time).
As concerns the other regime {zj = 0} ,′′ full collateral′′, we recall from the definitions
of past section that - being collateralization perfect/full - no partial, minimum transfer
amounts and reuse/rehypotecation clauses are considered and we have assumed just cash
or asset highly liquid as collateral - we have shown (see 2.11 and 2.12) that this is equal
11So, u contains Cad the set of admissible controls in which the solution must be searched.
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to the NPV process. But we are going to show that switching to full collateral generates
two possible expected costs to take in account in the objective functional. Recalling also
the existence of the same asset Bborrt , B
opp
t , B
rem
t defined in section 2.3 on funding and
collateral12 we have the following cases.
1. If ζj = 1 and NPV (s) > 0 (s ≥ τj), the counterparty (B) has to post the collateral
in a segregated account that must be remunerated at the free risk r (by the external
funder) but A cannot use or invest that amounts so she has an opportunity costs, say
ropp (set as a constant). Because this costs has to be considered until the collateral
is active (next switching) and the NPV is positive, we can define the integral of the
running costs function (which is taken until the next switching time τj+1) as∫ T∧τj+1
s
β(v)+[NPV (v)]+ds =
∫ T∧τj+1
s
exp−(ropp − r)v[NPV (v)]+ds s ∈ [τj , T ].
2. By the other side, if ζj = 1 and NPV (s) < 0 (s ≥ τj), A has to post the collateral
in a segregated account that must be remunerated at the free risk r (by the external
funder) but A now has to find the money to do this so she has a funding cost, say rborr.
Because this costs are alive until the collateral is active and the NPV is negative, we
can define the integral of running costs function (taken until the next switching time
τj+1) in this case as∫ T∧τj+1
s
β(v)−[NPV (v)]−ds =
∫ T∧τj+1
s
exp−(rborr − r)v[NPV (v)]−ds s ∈ [τj , T ]
So we can put the things together and being∫ T∧τj+1
s
[NPV (v)]ds =
∫ T∧τj+1
s
[NPV (v)]−ds+
∫ T∧τj+1
s
[NPV (v)]+ds
and setting
R(s) =
{
−β(s)− = − exp−(rborr − r)s , if {ζj = 1} and NPV < 0
β(s)+ = exp−(ropp − r)s , if {ζj = 1} and NPV > 0
and 0 otherwise13, we get that the running switching cost function for the bilateral case is
the following
Fζ(Y
u(s)) =
(∫ T∧τj+1
s
β(s)+[NPV (v)]+ds+
∫ T∧τj+1
s
β(s)−[NPV (v)]−ds−NPV (s)
)
=
(∫ T∧τj+1
s
R(s)[NPV (v)]ds−NPV (s)
)
for s ∈ [τj , T ], (26)
∀ τj , zj ∈ {T ,Z}. Let us note that before the integral we should set a summation over
j ≤ M to consider all the possible switches but we set it later in the general objective
functional; therefore we have set the minus before the NPV (s) because if it’s positive the
counterparty A receives the collateral which must be subtracted to the expected costs, if it’s
12To ease notation we set to zero the basis spreads bpt, b¯pt over the risk free rate.
13Note we have set the minus before the exponential in the case in which the NPV is negative in order to obtain
a positive value, in fact we’ve considered always positive values as costs according to the minimization objective.
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negative it must be added, being a sort of instantaneous cost or revenues (depending on the
sign). In effects it can be incorporated in the instantaneous cost part of the functional too,
but this make the switching boundary stochastic for which the analysis in more involved
and the optimal strategy may not exists14.
So, because of our problem is a minimization, given the structure and the definition for
Fζ(Y
u(s)) it can be positive or negative because of the last term (NPV (s)), we square it
by keeping the same structure of the other running function related to the zero collateral
case, so that we have
if {zj = 0} → F (Y u(s)) =
((∫ T∧τj+1
s
R(s)[NPV (v)]ds−NPV (s)
)
− δ
)2
for s ∈ [τj , T ]
and ∀ τj , zj ∈ {T ,Z}. Here the threshold δ is set equal to the running cost function of the
other regime switching, but it can be modeled differently.
b) for what concerns the function G(.) or reward function, because of our problem is of finite
time type and because of in T - which is the problem terminal state/time - we can get or
the terminal collateral value which equals (minus)15 the NPV (T ) if zT = 0 (or ζT = 1)
16,
or nothing, because the CVA is zero or almost zero, say , for t→ T if no collateralization
is kept active zT = 1 (or ζT = 1). Formally we set, as we work with the variance of the
running costs function respect to a given threshold δ, we have,
G(Y u(T )) = (− δ)2 × 1{zT=1} + (−NPV (T )− δ)21{zT=0}.
Actually, because it’s possible in theory that the agent decide to switch just before T , to
set off this type of behavior17 which causes a jump in the value function and to be more
general and formal we set zT− := limt→T zt = zT (and similarly for ζT−), and setting for
convenience NPV (T−) = NPV (T ) and  = 0, we can rewrite the reward function, that is
even our terminal/boundary condition, as
G(Y u(T )) =
{
(−NPV (T )ζT− − δ)2 ⇒ , if collateral is active
(0zT− − δ)2 ⇒ , otherwise no collateral
Here is important to remark that the valuation of the control problem is set in t with
t < τ ∧ T and all the value processes are intended as pre-default values and clearly τ =∞
in T .
c) What is left to model is the instantaneous switching costs function . It takes the fixed costs
that counterparty has to consider when switches regime. A typical working formulation is
the following:
K
(
Y u(τj), zj
)
=
M∑
j≥1
e−rτjczj (t)1{τj<T}, ∀ τj , zj ∈ {T ,Z},
14We refer to Hamadene & Zhang (2010) for details.
15The minus is due to the minimization costs setting, so if NPV T is positive it is not a cost, so we put the
minus ahead.
16Note that here we are making an abuse of notation setting zT instead of zM but these are meant to be the
same, that is M = T for the reward function. Therefore, this is one of the way to model this function that can
be modeled in a more complicated way.
17That is typical of the continuous time framework, when we will tackle the implementation, in discrete times
this won’t be relevant anymore.
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where the summation here replace the integral given that the instantaneous switching costs
happen at the future optimal switching times. Here the costs czj (t) are set as a deterministic
Fτj -measurable and where the initial valuation time is t = 0 to ease the notation.
Putting all these pieces together we get the general (bilateral) objective functional for our
problem
J (T ,Z)(y) = inf
u∈{Cad}
Ey
[∫ T
t=0
(exp−rs)
( M∑
j≥1
[
(CV A(s)−DV A(s))− δ]21{zj=1}
+
(
(
∫ T∧τj+1
u
R(s)[NPV (v)]du−NPV (s))− δ)21{zj=0})ds
+
M∑
j≥1
e−rτjczj (t)1{τj<T} +
(
−NPV (T )ζT− − δ
)2∣∣∣∣Ft
]
∀ s, τj ∈ [t, T ∧ τ ](27)
that can be represented in a more compact way, by setting
FZ(y, u) =

∑
j
[
(CV A(s)−DV A(s))− δ]2 + (0zT− − δ)2 if{zj = 1}∑
j
(( ∫ T∧τj+1
u
R(s)[NPV (v)]du−NPV (s))− δ)2 + (−NPV (T )ζT− − δ)2 , if {zj = 0}.
∀ s, τj ∈ [t, T ∧ τ ], which allow us to write our control problem as follows
J (T ,Z)(y) = = inf
u∈{Cad}
Ey
[∫ T
t=0
(exp−rs)[FZ(y, u)]ds+
M∑
j≥1
exp−rτj czj (t)1{τj<T}
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
subjecting everything to the given dynamics dY and the admissible control set Cad it tells us
that the objective is to find , if it exists and is unique, the optimal sequence of switching times
and indicators (zj , τj)
∗ = u∗ that minimize the expected costs functional, that is formally to find
the value function of the problem V (y) and u∗ ∈ Cad such that
V (t, x, λ;u) := V (y) = inf
{
Ju(y);u ∈ Cad
}
= Ju
∗
(y) (28)
with the terminal condition in T on the value function that will be
V (T, x;u) := inf
u
{(−NPV (T )ζT− − δ)2, (0zT− − δ)2}. (29)
3.3 Solution existence and uniqueness.
The switching control problem (3.5-3.7) formulated in the latter section can be seen as a special
two regime switching control problem with two different (running) cost functions and different
dynamics for each regime. This type of problem admits both an analytical representation through
(quasi) variational inequalities with interconnected obstacles and a stochastic representation
through reflected backward stochastic differential equations which are deeply connected (see
Mottola (2013) for a detailed discussion of the issue).
The main issues related to the solution of our problem can be sum up as follows:
a) the impossibility to assume (and guess) a smooth value functions V i for the switching nature
of the problem and the complexity of the system of PDE which are actually partial-integro
differential equations with interconnected obstcles ;
17
b) the non linearity of the cost functions F i (that do not grow linearly and are not lipschitzian)
and their recursive nature depending over time on the controls (the switching times τj and
indicators zj);
But thanks to results due to Djehiche, Hamadene & Popier (2008) on stochastic switching
control problems (with multiple regimes in finite horizon), we are able to tackle - under fairly
general assumptions - the solution existence for our problem via a stochastic approach based on
generalized Snell envelope tool.
In particular, we show that the solution of the switching problem - namely the determination
of the optimal switching strategy - coincides with the proof of the existence - via a verification
theorem - of the vector process (Y z, Y ζ) solution of a system of Snell envelopes, where Y z (resp.
Y ζ) indicates the optimal expected costs when collateral is set to zero (resp. one).
Theorem 4.2.2 (Verification theorem). Suppose there exist two processes Y z := (Y zt )0≤t≤T
and Y ζ := (Y ζt )0≤t≤T belonging to Kp such that for any t ∈ [0, T ] and a generic switching time
τ := τj
Y zt = ess supτ≥tE
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(τ−s)F z(s,Ys)ds+ (Y ζτ − e−rτ cz)1{τ<T}|Ft
]
, Y zT = 0, (30)
Y ζt = ess supτ≥tE
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(τ−s)F ζ(s,Y ′s)ds+ (Y zτ − e−rτ cζ)1{τ<T}|Ft
]
, Y ζT = 0. (31)
Then Y z and Y ζ are unique. Therefore, the following is verified
(a) Y z0 = V (u
∗) = sup
u∈Cad
(−J(y, u)). (32)
(b) Defining the stopping times sequence (τj)j≥1 as
τ1 = D0(Y
z = Y ζ − cz) on {τ1 < T} (and {z0 = 1}); (33)
τ2 = D1(Y
ζ = Y z − cζ) on {τ2 < T} (and {z0 = 1}); (34)
and in general for j ≥ 1
τ2j+1 = Dτ2j (Y
z = Y ζ − cz) on {τ2j+1 < T} (35)
τ2j+2 = Dτ2j+1(Y
ζ = Y z − cζ) on {τ2j+2 < T}. (36)
Then the switching control strategy u∗ := ((τ∗j )j≥1, (Zj)
∗
j≥1) is optimal.
Proof. For the proof we refer to Mottola (2013) which follows the same lines of the one in
the paper of Djehiche et al. (2008).
For the proof of uniqueness and of the deep result that connects the Snell envelope vector
solution (Y z, Y ζ) with the solution of backward SDE with reflection which are shown to be (under
some assumptions) also viscosity solutions of system of PDE with interconnected obstacles, we
also refer to Mottola (2013).
4 Numerical Solution: program description and results
4.1 Numerical procedure definition
In this last section we build on the theoretical results and insights of the past sections to define a
suitable numerical procedure in order to solve our switching problem. In particular, we recast the
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problem as an iterative optimal stopping time whose main ingredients for the numerical solution
are a Monte Carlo generator for the paths simulation, a backward induction procedure founded
on the dynamic programming principle and an approximation method (via least-square regres-
sion) of the nested conditional expectation at each step of the recursion. A detailed description
of the procedure implemented can be found in Mottola (2013).
4.2 Numerical procedure definition and analysis
Firstly, let us recall the main ingredients and assumptions of the problem we want to tackle
numerically. Firstly - following Carmona & Ludkovski (2006) - we recast our problem as an
iterative optimal stopping problem, that is
V 0(t, y, Z) := E
[ ∫ T
t
e−r(T−s)FZ(s,Ys)ds
∣∣Yt = y], . . . , (37)
V j(t, y, Z) := supτ∈T E
[ ∫ T∧τ
t
e−r(T−s)FZ(s,Ys)ds+ SW j,Z(τ,Yτ )
∣∣Yt = y] (38)
where t ∈ [0, T ], τ := τj (here we make an abuse of notation, but is intended that we assume
similar conditions on default times τ and switching times as in section four) and j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,M
represents a given number of switches allowed, Z = {z, ζ} the switching indicators, y indicates
the realization of our markovian vector dynamic Yt = (Xt, λt) set in section 3.1) intended to
be defined under the real/objective measure Q - we remind that the value function have to be
intended always negative with a minus ahead, to give sense to the minimization problem and that
the allowed switching time are finite because of the presence of switching costs - while SW (.) is
the switching/intervention operator which guide the recursion and takes the following expression
SW l,Z=z(τ,Yτ ) := max
Z∈Z
{V l−1(τ, y, Z = ζ)− cZ=zτ }
= {V l−1(τ, y, Z = ζ)− cZ=zτ },
given that the maximum is trivial in our case with only two regimes {z, ζ}. For what concerns our
modeling choice for the stochastic vector dynamic, because of we need numerous simulation of
the exposures of the given contract (represented by an IRS) not only at the valuation date t = 0
but also at forward times and given that the exposures depend - for what concerns the interest
rate modeling part - on the libor/forward rate evolution, a libor market model dynamic would
be the natural modeling choice. But given the complexity of the problem and the high number
of simulation and valuation date, using a LMM dynamic would be a cumbersome numerical task.
So, without great loss of generality, the choice has been in favor of a more manageable short
rate model. In order to ensure a grater variety of shapes of the simulated term structure we use
for the computations a shifted two factor gaussian short rate model (say G2++). Indeed, the
dynamics for X becomes
Xt := rt = yt + zt + ϕt, r(0) = r0
where the processes {yt : t ≥ 0} and {zt : t ≥ 0} satisfy
dyt = −µytdt+ σdW 1t , y(0) = y0
dzt = −νytdt+ ηdW 2t , z(0) = z0
d〈y, z〉t = d〈W 1,W 2〉t = ρy,zdt
where (W 1,W 2) is a two-dimensional Q Brownian motion with instantaneous correlation ρ ∈
[−1, 1], ϕt is a deterministic function that ensures the fitting on the initial market term structure
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and {r0, µ, ν, σ, η} are positive constant parameters representing the drifts and instantaneous
volatilities of rt = Xt (here to ease the notation we omit to highlight the market price of risk in
the drift dynamic).Because of diffusion parameters do not change under change of measure and
we are not under the pricing measure we have chosen to calibrate it on the historical volatility
of the reference rate underlying the contract, typically the six months euribor. The remaining
parameters are instead determined by standard calibration on the cap-floor quotes.
For what concerns the model for the default intensity λt, the choice has been in favor of a typical
Cox process with stochastic intensity λ, assumed Ft-adapted, positive and right continuous
(Fλt = σ({λs : s ≤ t})) having dynamic of CIR type given below
dλt = κ(γ − λt)dt+ υ
√
λtdW
λ
t
λ(0) = λ0
where Wλt is also a standard Q-Brownian motion. We also recall that the cumulated intensity
or hazard process is defined as Λ(T ) =
∫ T
0
λtdt which is a random variable (absolutely) continuous
and increasing. In this framework Λ(T ) play a central role for jump time τ simulation given that
the first jump time of the process, transformed through its cumulated intensity, is an exponential
random ξ variable independent of Ft (being part of the defaultable filtration Ht), that is
Λ(τ) = ξ =⇒ (inverting)
τ := Λ−1(ξ)
The procedure to simulate the default times τ is the standard one (see for example Brigo &
Mercurio (2006)). The vector process parameters (κ, γ, υ) of positive constants, can be in general
calibrated to credit/bond market spreads or CDS spreads of specific names. In particular, we will
distinguish between two different cases using the market quotes of two different names (labeled as
LOW and HIGH counterparty risk) for volatilities and drift of the default intensities in order to
investigate the effects on the value function and the optimal switching strategy of the problem.
In the following tables we summarize the SDEs parameters and those related to the perfect
collateralization regime and funding, the borrowing rborr, opportunity costs ropp and for the
switching costs cZ that we need to set in computations. The parameter δ is set equal to zero and
to meaningful value in order to check the impact on the solution and on the optimal switching
strategy. Here follows a table of the variables and the related parameters of our model.
Xt λ Other parameters
µ κ ropp
ν γ rborr
σ υ Rc
η cz
ρ czeta
δ
The steps of the path discretization and of the chosen implementation procedure - done under
the symmetry hypothesis18 - are detailed in Mottola (2013).
Here, let us just explicit the program the we need to implement for the solution of our swit-
ching control problem.
18See proposition 5.2.1 on symmetry of Mottola (2013)
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a) Let us consider for simplicity two calculation times t1 and t2, thanks to the stated optimality
principle, the counterparty has to decide between immediate switch at t1 to the other regime
z (or ζ) versus no switching and wait until t2. So, discretizing the recursive equations
(4.1)-(4.2) for the value function, we run the following program:
V l(t1,Yt1 , Z) = max
(
E
[ ∫ t2
t1
FZ(s,Ys)ds+ V l(t2,Yt2 , Z)|Ft1
]
, SW l,Z(t1,Yt1)
)
' max
(
FZ(t1,Yt1)∆t+ E
[
V l(t2,Yt2 , Z)|Ft1
]
,
{V l−1(t1,Yt1 , Z = ζ)− cZ=zt1 }
)
formulation that becomes in our cost minimization problem as follow
V l(t1,Yt1 , Z) ' min
(
FZ(t1,Yt1)∆t+ E
[
V l(t2,Yt2 , Z)|Ft1
]
, {V l−1(t1,Yt1 , Z = ζ) + cZ=zt1 }
)
where here BCV A∆t1 = Yt1,z (and similarly Collct1 = Yt1,ζ), so that the last one can be
made more explicit as follows{
if in t2 {Z = z}
}
=⇒
V l(t1,Yt1 , Z) ' min
(
(BCV A∆t1 − δ)2∆t+ E
[
V l(t2,Yt2 , z)|Ft1
]
, {V l−1(t1,Yt1 , ζ) + czt1}
)
(39){
if in t2 {Z = ζ}
}
=⇒
V l(t1,Yt1 , Z) ' min
(
(Collct1−δ)2∆t+E
[
V l(t2,Yt2 , ζ)|Ft1
]
, {V l−1(t1,Yt1 , z)+cζt1}
)
. (40)
Here the conditional expectation of the cost function E[.|Ft1 ] represents the value of waiting
- like the well known holding/continuation value - until the next switching time remaining
in the same regime. At this point, to calculate this conditional expectation we have chosen
to reapply the Longstaff-Schwartz algorithm to the simulated paths (BCV A∆ and Collc)
that enter our cost functions which we recall here (discretized in the case of an interest
rate swap)
BCV A∆(ti) = (1−Rc)E
[
NPV (ti+1)
∣∣Fti]∆tλ(ti, ti+1) +BCV A(ti+1)
= (1−Rc)
[∑
s
Btiξti(L(ti, ti+s)− k)
]
(ti+1 − ti)λ(ti, ti+1) +BCV A(ti+1)
Collc(ti) = Rfund(ti+1 − ti)E
[
NPV (ti+1)
∣∣Fti]∆t+NPV (ti+1)
= Rfund(ti+1 − ti)
[∑
s
Btiξti(L(ti, ti+s)− k)
]
(ti+1 − ti) + Collc(ti+1)
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∀ti ∈ [0, T ] and paths ω, with {ti ≤ τ} and {τj ≤ ti < τj+1} (this means that the
default time can happen and is bucketed at the valuation time ti which can coincide with
a switching time τj).
Once this is done, the iterative procedure can be started firstly initializing the value func-
tion at the maturity setting V l(T,YT , Z) = 0 ∀ l, z and then going backward computing
iteratively the continuation values E
[
V l(tn,Ytn , z)|Ftn−1
]
along each paths. Then adding
the term FZ(tn,Ytn)∆t and taking the minimum as in equation 4.3 (or 4.4), averaging
and discounting back to inception t = 0 one obtains the value function for the problem
(actually the value functions are two as shown in section 4 depending on the initial regime
Z from which starts the iterative optimal stopping program). By keeping trace of the pa-
ths in which is optimal to switch/not switch one can easily recover the optimal switching
strategy {τ∗j , Z∗j }j≥1.
b) In addition or alternatively to the procedure shown above, one can keep trace of the smallest
optimal switching time τ l(tn,Ytn , Z) that is also computed in backward manner and re-
presents for every path the smallest time in which is optimal to switch to an other regime.
The formal (recursive) definition is the following:
τ l(tn,Ytn , Z) =
{
τ l(tn+1,Ytn+1 , Z), noswitch
n, switch
and the value function will be given by the sum path by path of the future costs (discounted)
until the optimal switching times, namely
V l(tn∆t,Ytn∆t , Z) = E
[ τ l∑
j=n
FZ(j∆t,Yj∆t)∆t+ SW l,Z(τ l∆t,Yτ l∆t)|Ftn∆t
]
. (41)
We conclude by noting that the last formulation for the value function allows faster com-
putations because here the regressions are not stored, they are just used to update the
switching times.
c) The last thing that we need to highlight is how to recover the optimal switching boundary for
our problem. It represents the graph (t,Yt) of the boundaries at which our optimal swit-
ching strategy changes regime (for each l, Z). Keeping track of the minimal switching times
τ l, one can reconstruct the switching boundary by drawing, at the end of the algorithm,
the graph of τ l(0,Y0, Z) against Yt. Formally, the set{Yn∆t : ∀ n | τ l(0,Yn, Z) = n} (42)
is defined as the empirical region of switching from a given regime Z at time n∆t. It is
important to recover the switching boundaries especially in a risk management view, as
one can construct and check the optimal switching policies by simulating paths of Y and
verifying the minor costs and benefits obtained by the implementation of the switching
policy (also respect to the one that would have been implemented without the flexibility
of the switching type mechanism).
4.3 Numerical implementation and examples.
In this section we pass to show and analyze the main results of the implementation of the
algorithm above defined for the solution of our stochastic switching control problem. From the
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results of sections 3, we are sure of the existence of a solution for our problem and also of the
optimal switching strategy, although this strategy can also reveal to be of ”banal type” (as stated
in Definition 4.5.2 of Mottola (2013)) .
More specifically, in addition to the switching costs whose level can determine the convenience
to switch, we expect that, the volatility of the stochastic factors of our model, in particular the
volatility and drift parameters of the default intensities would have a relevant impact on the
switching strategy of the counterparty that is brought to switch more often19.
Market spot rates and Zero Coupon
Maturity Id Spot Rates Discount Factors
1m EUR030 0.382% 0.9997
3m EUR090 0.662% 0.9983
6m EUR180 0.939% 0.9953
1y EUR360 1.226% 0.9879
2y EURS02 0.876% 0.9827
3y EURS03 0.985% 0.9710
4y EURS04 1.151% 0.9553
5y EURS05 1.331% 0.9360
7y EURS07 1.632% 0.8929
10y EURS10 1.949% 0.8245
12y EURS12 2.089% 0.7802
15y EURS15 2.204% 0.7211
20y EURS20 2.211% 0.6457
25y EURS25 2.202% 0.5802
30y EUR.S30 2.193% 0.5217
In the following we focus the analysis on these variables and we report the results of the
implementation of the program defined in section 4.2 applied to a simple defaultable interest rate
swap, EURIBOR6m vs fixed rate (for convenience the setting of the rate is in arrears) traded at
par and maturing in one year T = 1Y from the inception t. The data used in computations are
taken at the reference date of 2012/06/15 from the main international data provider (Bloomberg
and Reuters).
Here we report the market yield curve build on monetary rates (EURIBOR RATES) before the
year and on the swap rates after the year, and the ATM (flat) implied Cap volatilities
19In our model the funding costs are modeled as deterministic; of course in reality a counterparty which sees
its default intensities increase see also the credit worthiness get lower with a likely increase also in the cost of
funding. In this sense, one should need a stochastic model also for funding costs correlated with default intensities
or eventually including also liquidity spreads issues. Here we work with a simpler deterministic hypothesis, which
is enough to get some results, but with our numerical approach MC based it would not be difficult to generalize
it adding an other stochastic factor (of course one should be prepared to deal with the increasing computational
costs)
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Maturity Market implied vol
1Y 94.2%
1.5Y 93%
2Y 90.6%
3Y 67.7%
4Y 63.7%
5Y 61.2%
6Y 59.1%
7Y 57.5%
8Y 56.2%
9Y 54.8%
10Y 53.6%
12Y 51.6%
15Y 49.6%
20Y 48.8%
25Y 47.7%
30Y 46.4%
Being traded at par, the strike rate used is the one year par swap rate S01 = 0.91%. In order to
keep a good representation of the reality by the model and to deal also with computational costs,
the discretization step used to simulate the vector dynamics and to update the switching strategy,
has been chosen to be daily, that is ∆t = 1N where N = 252 (counting only the working days).
The parameters of the G2 + + process for Xt calibrated on market implied (Black) volatilities,
are the following
Calibrated parameters Values
µ 0.00013
ν 0.06730
σ 0.12924
η 0.14014
ρ −0.99948
while the daily historical volatility of the EURIBOR6m, calculated over the last year data
sample, is σhist = 0.12654. The calibration procedure is a standard minimization of sum of the
square percentage difference between the model and the market price20. Excluding the default
intensities on which we have decided to focus the analysis of the value function behavior, in
calculations we have set the remaining parameters as follows:
• the risk-free rate rfree being near to zero, if one considers as reference the 1Y yield from
German bond, is set simply as constant rfree = 0;
• the borrowing rate rborr should consider the particular balance-sheet and risk condition of
the counterparty. For convenience we assume it as constant set to rborr = 0.01;
20Namely, we solve the following problem:
min
θ
npayments∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣Pmkt(t, i)− Pmodel(t, i, θ)
Pmkt(t, i)
∣∣∣∣∣∣2.
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• similar considerations are valid for the opportunity rate ropp which is set equal to ropp =
0.03 by considering on average the rate of return of no risk free investments in the current
stagnant market situation;
• the instantaneous switching costs cz and cζ are set as constants not greater than the 2%
of the notional of the underlying contract. Anyway, we show their impact on the switching
strategy by varying their values;
• the recovery rate parameter Rc is assumed fixed and equal to 40% loss recovery if counter-
party defaults;
• the parameter δ which enters in the cost functions is also set to zero (this means that
counterparty would be adverse to every variation from zero of the running costs) δ = 0 and
then varied.
As already mentioned, for what concerns the default intensities parameters we have calibrated
the model parameters (κ, γ, λ0) on the following CDS spreads quotes of two bank names (at the
same date 15/6/2012)
CDS spreads: Dexia=HIGH, DB= LOW
Bucket Dexia DB
1Y 915.716 93.648
3Y 817.403 156.834
5Y 782.0214 196.917
7Y 825.052 206.326
10Y 796.494 214.172
given the intention to investigate the results in case of HIGH (Dexia Subordinated) and LOW
(Deutsche Bank (Senior), DB) default risk level for the counterparty. The calibration results are
reported in the following table with the volatility parameter υ which is set taking the (daily)
CDS historical volatility over the last two year.
λt parametrization
level LOW HIGH
κ 1.03921 0.30821
γ 0.02120 0.11220
υ 0.20122 0.44214
λ0 0.04031 0.20316
Results in HIGH CASE. From the application of the algorithm described in the last section
and with the parametrization set as follows:
- λt = HIGH;
- cz = 0 and cζ = 0;
- δ = 0;
- Z = ζ = 0 in T , at maturity;
- Npaths = 1000 which indicates the number of simulated paths; these are enough to derive
the optimal switching strategy and to understand the value function behavior. In fact
the problem has been tackled from a risk management view so that from a pricing view a
greater number of paths should be run (other than a change of measure under which make
calculations).
Given the other parameters as defined above, we get the following main results.
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Figura 2: Graph of the switching indicators Z = {0, 1} over time t ∈ [0, 252]
In Fig. 2 we have plotted the switching indicators Z = {0, 1} that are determined
optimally by the application of the iterative switching algorithm (equations 4.3 and 4.4)
over the time (discretized) domain t ∈ [0, 252]. It shows almost four region in which the
switching over the paths and time have a daily frequency but also a big mass given the
high number of paths in which results to be optimal to switch and switch back often. This
was expected given the higher volatility of the default intensities and the fact that the
instantaneous switching costs cZ are set to zero. This behavior can be seen also from Fig.
3 in which we have plotted the minimum number of remaining (optimal) switches registered
over the paths and time (as time elapses). Being the total number of switches equal to the
number of time steps (253), by time elapsing also the number of switches decreases and the
plot clearly shows in correspondence of flat lines and (negative) jumps the passage from of
a period of non activity in terms of switching to a period of activity .
We also report in Fig. 4 the graph of the optimal switching boundaries for our problem as
defined in equation 4.5. The upper line shows the optimal values of the paths of Yz above
which it becomes optimal to switch, while the lower line indicates the paths for Yζ above
which is not optimal to switch. So the area between the two boundaries can be defined as
the ”non action/switching area”.
This boundaries are central in the risk management view, given that by confronting these
values with that of simulated paths of the stochastic vector dynamic that guide a given
underlying claim one can study and define an optimal strategy that maximizes the hedging
portfolio wealth or minimizes the related costs.
In the following table we summarize the results of the value function (with initial condition
ζ = 0) for our problem, with a notional (of the underlying contract) Notional = 1000
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Figura 3: Graph of the minimum number of remaining switches for all the paths Npaths over
time t ∈ [0, 252]
Figura 4: Graph of the switching boundaries as defined in equation 5.9 (t ∈ [1, 250])
Results ( λt = HIGH, cZ = 0)
V (t, u)∗ 0.0755
V (t, u)Cva 0.2452
V (t, u)Coll 0.1116
In the table we have also reported the value function values in the case of no switch allowed,
namely V (t, u)Cva is referred to the case z = 1 (no collateralization) ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] and
V (t, u)Coll is referred to the complement z = 0 (ζ = 1, full collateralization). As one could
have expected, the CVA term V (t, u)Cva has the greatest value given the higher default
intensities, while the value function V (t, u)∗ with the contingent switching collateralization
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allows to minimize the costs (as defined above) given the greater flexibility of the mechanism
with consistent savings over the funding/collateralization and CVA costs, especially if one
considers higher level of contract’s notional.
In the following ones, we report similar results as shown above highlighting the variation
of the instantaneous switching costs cZ and the effects on value function.
Figura 5: Graph of the switching indicators Z = {0, 1} over time t ∈ [0, 252], with cz = cζ = 0.01
Results ( λt = HIGH, cz = cζ = 0.01)
V (t, u)∗ 0.1014
V (t, u)Cva 0.2452
V (t, u)Coll 0.1116
Results ( λt = HIGH, cz = cζ = 0.05)
V (t, u)∗ 0.1116
V (t, u)Cva 0.2452
V (t, u)Coll 0.1116
From these graphs and results, we can see that by increasing the instantaneous costs of
switching reduces the optimality of switching from a regime to the other as shown in Fig.
5 and 6 in which the vertical lines that indicates the outcome of switching indicators over
paths and time are very rare or an horizontal line which indicates zero switches; in particu-
lar the tables shows how the value functions tends to increase and converge to the case that
we have defined (see in Definition 4.5.2 of Mottola (2013) as banal switching strategy , that
corresponds also to the value function of the case of not switching V (t, u)Coll = V (t, u)∗.
We made also some trial by increasing the value of δ; in general this increases the cost
functions and reduce the convenience to switch but with different setting of the switching
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Figura 6: Graph of the switching indicators Z = {0, 1} over time t ∈ [0, 252], with cz = cζ = 0.05
costs the effect on the value function is not obvious. So, it is important to study each case
carefully. From a risk management point of view, it is relevant to know or to estimate in
advance the instantaneous switching costs (cz, cζ) in order to determine the optimal savings
through the flexibility of switching mechanism.
Results in LOW CASE. In this case the parametrization set is the following:
- λt = LOW;
- cz = 0 and cζ = 0;
- δ = 0;
- Z = ζ = 0 in T , at maturity;
- Npaths = 1000.
Keeping the other parameters as set above, we get the following main results.
In this case, although the switching costs cZ are null, we can see from Fig. 7 that the
lower default intensities λt determine the optimality for counterparty to switch only in the
last part of the time domain where the expected cost functions of the two regimes turn to
be really near path by path. This can be also easily checked by the plot of the minimum
number of remaining switches through time (registered over all the paths) (Fig. 8).
If one tries to set significantly positive instantaneous switching costs cZ > 0, no switches
take place anymore getting similar results as shown in Fig. 6.
This behavior can be also verified from the results of the value function in this case.
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Figura 7: Graph of the switching indicators Z = {0, 1} over time t ∈ [0, 252], with cz = cζ = 0.0
Figura 8: Graph of the minimum number of remaining switches for all the paths Npaths over
time t ∈ [0, 252]
Results ( λt = LOW , cz = cζ = 0)
V (t, u)∗ 0.0117
V (t, u)Cva 0.0153
V (t, u)Coll 0.1116
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From the table, we note that the model value function V (t, u)∗ and that without possibility
to switch from the CV A regime V (t, u)Cva are almost equal, while the running costs of
the collateralized regime are higher and equal to the case cZ = 0 of the HIGH case results.
Here in fact what changes are just the default intensities which have much lower drift
and volatility than the latter case. Similar reasoning and careful check has to be done by
changing the other parameters of the model.
From the results just showed, we can say that:
• the value function results show a clear dependence on counterparty default intensities
which impact on CVA cost function, given the other parameters; of course varying also the
collateral/funding costs we would get different values of V (t, u)∗, as we expected from the
theory;
• we have also shown that the number of switching times depends on how far are over the
paths the cost functions and the related conditional expectation from continuation. If
these terms are near we verify period of switching activity especially if the instantaneous
switching costs are null; instead by increasing these costs (both) we get that the value
function tends towards a banal solution21;
• we also mention that the higher number of switching increase in general the value of
the contingent collateralization of switching type as one would expect in the sense that a
similar type of optionality should be valued more as long as the switches are expected to be
convenient over time. This also implies that this type of contingency should be valued more
and can be an optimal way to manage counterparty risk in cases in which counterparties
default intensities are high an in ”volatile” market conditions.
5 Conclusions and further research.
The present research work has been focussed on the study and the analysis of general defaultable
OTC contract in presence of the so called contingent CSA, that is a counterparty risk mitigation
mechanism of switching type. The underlying economic idea and objective has been to show
that standard/regulatory collateralization mechanism are useful to reduce the default losses but
they imposes to take in account the cost of collateral and funding, in contrast, by the other side,
to the (bilateral) CVA costs. In this sense we have been lead to analyze this problem from the
risk management and optimal design point of view, taking the perspective of just one party
of the contract. By tackling this task, we have formulated a stochastic switching control model
in which the counterparty can optimally decide to switch from zero to perfect collateralization
over the life of the underlying contract. We have analyzed the main possible approaches - ana-
lytical/PDE and stochastic/BSDE - in order to show the existence of the solution and of the
optimal switching strategy, finding in the stochastic one the most suitable to tackle our highly
non linear and recursive model.
We have also studied the numerical approaches for the solution coming to the definition of an
algorithm based on an iterative optimal stopping approach combined with the Longstaff-Schwartz
simulation method.
The results in the specific case of a defaultable interest rate swap, show clearly - especially when
counterparty default intensities are high and volatile - the relevance of the switching mechanism
in reducing the overall costs respect to the perfect and zero collateral cases, that is in absence
of contingent CSA. Of course further researches are necessary in order to remove some of the
21We recall this is defined in definition 4.5.2 of Mottola (2013).
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working assumptions and to generalize the problem objective functional or also the numerical
solution approach.
A tough but interesting case is when the contingent mechanism becomes bilateral and the stra-
tegic interaction is allowed between the counterparties and the price-hedge problem for this type
of contracts with contingent collateralisation, which will be definitely objects of future works.
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